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WHEN A HANDICAP MAY BE AN ADVANTAGE:
MCPHERSON v. MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION EVALUATES THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT AND THE ADA TO ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION MAXIMUM SEMESTER RULES
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an alarming trend in many high school athletic pro-
grams to place competitiveness substantially ahead of academic
concerns.1 In an effort to help curb this tendency, high school ath-
letic associations usually maintain eligibility requirements for stu-
dent athletes.2 While these regulations serve an important policing
function in high school athletics, they can be detrimental to stu-
dents with disabilities who are unable to progress at a regular rate
through the school system. 3 Since these disabled students are typi-
cally older or have spent more time in school, regulations often
curtail their athletic eligibility.4
Over the past few years, several students with disabilities used
the court system to try to preserve their athletic eligibility.5 In these
1. See WALTER CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 16.7 (1990 & Supp.
1996). Common practices include redshirting and recruiting students to transfer
from one school district to another. See id. For a detailed discussion of the prac-
tice of redshirting, which involves holding back a student academically for athletic
purposes, see infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
2. See id.
3. See infra notes 118-54 and accompanying text.
4. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF AMATEUR SPORTS LAw 322 (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing how extra years often needed by disabled students to complete their
education force many of them to exceed age limit for athletic competition).
For example, a mentally disabled student may need to repeat a couple of
grades in school. By the time a student becomes an academic junior, he or she
may have already celebrated his or her 19th birthday. The student will become
ineligible to compete in interscholastic sports if the athletic association has a maxi-
mum age limit of 18 years-old.
5. See DR. HERB APPENZELLER, THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE: THE LAW AND INDI-
VIDUALS WITH HANDICAPPED CONDITIONS IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND SPORTS 143
(1983) (commenting on increasing number of handicapped individuals seeking
redress in court). For examples of these cases, see Johnson v. Florida High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, Inc., 102 F.3d 1172 (l1th Cir. 1997) (granting injunction against
enforcement of maximum age rule against disabled student after finding possible
reasonable accommodation); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding age-eligibility rule was neutral regulation
that was valid under Rehabilitation Act and ADA); Pottgen v. Missouri State High
Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994) (permitting enforcement of maxi-
mum age rule against learning disabled student); Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 89-6450, 1990 WL 104036, at *1 (6th Cir. July 25, 1990)
(327)
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cases, the students typically allege that the athletic association rule
violates the plaintiff's rights under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act) 6 and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA). 7 Courts are divided on whether or not a disabled
student can use the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to circumvent
eligibility regulations.8
The Sixth Circuit assessed the applicability of the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the ADA as a basis for challenging a maximum semes-
ter regulation in McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic
Association, Inc.9 In McPherson, Dion McPherson, who had recently
been diagnosed with a learning disability, wanted to play varsity bas-
ketball for Huron High School but the athletic association's maxi-
mum semester rule precluded his participation. 10 The district court
granted an injunction that allowed him to play basketball, but the
Sixth Circuit determined that the lower court should not have pro-
vided McPherson with a waiver pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA.1
This Note analyzes how the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
affect the efforts of disabled students to participate in high school
athletic programs. Section II of the Note reviews the Rehabilitation
Act, the ADA and how courts have interpreted their application to
(allowing handicapped student to play sports due to Rehabilitation Act despite
transfer rule); Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F.
Supp. 663 (D. Conn.), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (enjoining athletic
conference from denying disabled student waiver of maximum-age rule); Reaves v.
Mills, 904 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding application of age rule under
ADA); Hoot v. Milan Area Schs., 853 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (finding gen-
uine issue of material fact as to whether MHSAA violated disabled students' rights
under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA); Booth v. University Interscholastic
League, No. Civ. A-90-CA-764, 1990 WL 484414, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1990)
(extending preliminary injunction against enforcement of 19 year-old eligibility
rule based on likelihood of plaintiff prevailing on merits of Rehabilitation Act
claim); Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (per-
mitting student's request for injunction to permit his participation in sport sea-
son); University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993) (determining that allowing participation in athletics was reasonable
accommodation and over-19 rule violated Rehabilitation Act).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). For the text of section 504, see infra note 21.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
8. See supra note 5. For a discussion of the differing court treatments of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA's relation to athletic association eligibility rules,
see infra notes 118-54 and accompanying text.
9. 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
10. Id. at 456. He sought a waiver from the rule but the Michigan High
School Athletic Association (MHSAA) refused his request. See id. at 456-57.
11. See id. at 458, 463-64.
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athletic eligibility requirements. 12 Section III discusses the relevant
facts in McPherson.13 Section IV examines the Sixth Circuit's opin-
ion in McPherson.14 Finally, Section V considers the potential im-
pact of the McPherson decision on future cases involving the athletic
eligibility of disabled students. 15
II. BACKGROUND
The advent of federal legislation aimed at eliminating disability
discrimination raises questions regarding the application of athletic
regulations to handicapped students. 16 Subpart A of this section
examines the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Subpart B explores
age and semester-based athletic eligibility requirements and then
considers the relation between the federal statutes and these
regulations.
A. Disability Legislation
1. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
As a means to help eliminate the various obstacles faced by the
disabled, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.17 For
the millions of Americans with disabilities, 18 the Rehabilitation Act
aims to provide assistance in various aspects of everyday life.' 9 Spe-
cifically, the Act targets discrimination by recipients or participants
12. For a discussion of the Rehabilitation Act, see infra notes 17-48 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the ADA, see infra notes 49-74 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of athletic eligibility requirements in general, see infra.
notes 75-117 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the application of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to eligibility requirements, see infra notes 118-54
and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 155-76 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 177-245 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 118-54 and accompanying text.
17. See S. Rep. No. 93-318 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2078-
79. The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare believed that it was "necessary to
emphasize that the final goal of all rehabilitation services was to improve in every
possible respect the lives as well as livelihood of individuals served ...." Id.
18. See DON FERSH & PETER W. THOMAS, COMPLYING WITH THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, A GUIDEBOOK FOR MANAGEMENT AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 7-
8 (1993) (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
MEDICAL REHABILITATION RESEARCH (1990)). Approximately forty-three million
Americans have disabilities including 5.7 million who are mentally retarded. See id.
19. See Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government:
The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1089, 1090 (1995) (noting that section
504 of Rehabilitation Act is key to "enabling persons with disabilities to participate
in the fullness of daily life in this country").
1998]
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in federally funded programs.20 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act provides that programs or activities receiving federal financial
aid may not exclude otherwise qualified individuals solely due to
the plaintiffs disability.2 1
In order to make a general claim under the Rehabilitation Act,
a plaintiff must demonstrate four factors. 22 The plaintiff must
prove: (1) he or she is "handicapped" under the Act, (2) he or she
is "otherwise qualified" for the position sought, (3) he or she was
excluded from the position sought solely by reason of his or her
handicap, and (4) the program or activity in question receives fed-
20. See HENRY H. PERRI=r, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr HANDBOOK 105-
06 (1990) (discussing purpose and target of Rehabilitation Act).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). This section, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as
defined in section 706(8) of this tire, shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity con-
ducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to
appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation
may take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which
such regulation is so submitted to such committees.
(b) "Program or activity" defined
For the purposes of this section, the term "program or activity" means all
of the operations of-
(1) (A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instru-
mentality of a State or of a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such
assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or
local government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case
of assistance to a State or local government;
(2) (A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a pub-
lic system of higher education; or
(B) a local educational agency (as defined in section 8801 of tide 20)
system of vocational education, or other school system;
(d) Standards used in determining violation of section
The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated
in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section
shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 .. . (42 U.S.C. 12201-12204 and 12210), as such sections
relate to employment.
Id.
22. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 5: p. 327
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eral financial assistance. 23 If the four factors are present, the plain-
tiff has demonstrated a violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
The first requirement is that the plaintiff is an "individual with
a disability." 24 The Act defines a disability as a physical or mental
impairment which "substantially limits one or more of such per-
son's major life activities. ' 25 Federal regulations further state that
major life activities involve the use of one's senses, the thought pro-
cess and the ability to carry on in everyday life. 26 Therefore, a
plaintiff meets the first requirement of a Rehabilitation Act claim by
having this type of a substantial limitation on a major life activity.
Next, the plaintiff must show that he or she is "otherwise quali-
fied" for the program. 27 The test for establishing this factor was
expressed by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis.28 In Davis, the Court reviewed a lower court holding that to
be "otherwise qualified" for a program, a plaintiff had to be able to
satisfy a program's requirements in every respect except for limita-
23. See, e.g., Strathie v. Department of Transportation, 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d
Cir. 1983). In Strathie, Van Trans, Inc., a private bus company hired and trained
the plaintiff, James Strathie, to provide transportation for students in public school
districts. Id. at 228. Strathie passed the school bus driver license test and began
work for Van Trans. See id. After discovering that Strathie wore a hearing aid, the
Department of Transportation suspended his school bus license because wearing a
hearing aid violated a department regulation. See id. Except for his hearing aid,
Strathie was qualified in every other respect to be licensed to drive a school bus.
See id. at 229.
In February 1979, Strathie sued, among others, the Department of Transpor-
tation. See Strathie, 716 F.2d at 229. He alleged that it had violated section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act as well as due process, equal protection, the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 and other state laws. See id. The complaint sought an injunction that
would prevent the Department of Transportation from enforcing its regulations,
thereby permitting Strathie to continue to drive a school bus. See id. The district
court dismissed all of Strathie's claims. See id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit examined Strathie's Rehabilitation Act claim.
See id. The court stated the four factors necessary for a plaintiff to bring a claim
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230. In apply-
ing the four factors to the case, the Third Circuit concluded that Strathie was a
handicapped individual who was suspended solely due to his handicap. See id. It
was also noted that the school bus driver licensing program receives federal fund-
ing. See id. In addition, the Third Circuit held that further determination was
necessary as to whether accommodating a person who wore a hearing aid would
present an unreasonable risk to school bus passengers. See id. at 234.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
26. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (1996) (including "caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working" as major life activities).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
28. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
1998]
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tions imposed by a handicap. 29 The Court determined that this
reading of the requirement was inaccurate since it did not consider
the extent of a handicap's limitation in determining whether the
person was "otherwise qualified."30 Instead, the Davis Court held
that an "otherwise qualified" person is one who, in spite of the disa-
bility, can meet all of a program's requirements.3 1 In effect, the
Court stated that if a plaintiff's disability made him or her unable to
meet an essential requirement of a program, the program may ex-
clude the plaintiff without violating section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.32
Despite this pronouncement, the Court noted that changes in
a program may be necessary when refusing to do so would be un-
reasonable and discriminatory. 33 This duty to effect change in a
program applies so long as such modifications are reasonable. 34
The Davis Court limited "reasonable" alterations to modifications
29. Id. at 406. The plaintiff, Frances B. Davis, a student at Southeastern Com-
munity College, sought admission into the school's nursing program. See id. at
400. During the application and interview process, the program discovered that
Davis had a hearing problem. See id. Subsequently, the plaintiff took an auditory
examination to fully diagnose her hearing. See id. at 401.
The examiners determined that the plaintiff had bilateral sensori-neural hear-
ing loss, which required Davis to wear a hearing aid. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 401.
Further, the examiners concluded that the plaintiff would still have difficulty un-
derstanding normal speech and would have to depend on lip reading to effectively
communicate. See id. As a result of this examination and following a recommen-
dation of the State Board of Nursing, the college rejected Davis's application to the
nursing program. See id. Davis asked the college to reconsider its decision but the
staff voted to deny the application. See id. at 402.
The plaintiff filed a discrimination claim under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. See id. at 402-03. The district court noted that reliance on lip reading
would be completely ineffective in situations such as when doctors and nurses have
to wear surgical masks. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 403. Consequently, the district court
ruled that Davis was not otherwise qualified under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act to gain admission into the nursing program. See id. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that the district court
should have focused only on academic and technical qualifications and disre-
garded the effects of Davis's handicap. See id. at 404.
30. See id. The Court stated that this holding "assumes, in effect, that a person
need not meet legitimate physical requirements in order to be 'otherwise quali-
fied."' Id. at 406.
31. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406.
32. See id. at 406-07.
33. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-13.
34. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 & n.17 (1987). In evaluating
whether the plaintiff was otherwise qualified for a job, the Arline Court decided
that it must consider whether a "reasonable accommodation" would enable the
person with a disability to perform. Id. The Court further noted that employers
have an affirmative duty to make reasonable accommodations for handicapped
employees. See id. at 289 n.19.
[Vol. 5: p. 327
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that were not substantial adjustments in the program. 35 Accord-
ingly, the court implied that failure to substantially alter a program
requirement would not constitute a violation of the Rehabilitation
Act.36
In Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry,37 the Sixth Circuit fur-
ther clarified the situations in which a program had to reasonably
accommodate a handicapped individual. 38 In Doherty, an optometry
student brought a claim under the Rehabilitation Act that the col-
lege had discriminated against him as a result of his visual disability,
which caused him to fail to meet program requirements.3 9 The cir-
cuit court ruled that the college of optometry did not have to ac-
commodate the plaintiff by waiving a proficiency requirement.
40
The court held that since proficiency tests were a necessary require-
ment for graduating with a degree, waiving the tests would be a
substantial rather than a reasonable accommodation. 41 By this
standard, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Rehabilitation Act
does not mandate programs to waive necessary requirements. 42
To satisfy the third element of a Rehabilitation Act claim, the
plaintiff must produce evidence that he or she has been excluded
due solely to his or her disability.43 This requirement, however,
takes into account that a plaintiff may need to meet certain physical
qualifications in order to qualify for a program.44 In Southeastern
35. Davis, 442 U.S. at 410. The Davis Court noted that substantial adjustments
were an unauthorized extension of the employer's duties under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. It also stated that a fundamental alteration in the nature of
a program is beyond the modification required by the regulation. See id.
36. See id.
37. 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988).
38. Id. at 575.
39. Id. at 572-73. The plaintiff had retinitis pigmentosa, which was an associ-
ated neurological condition that restricted his visual field. See id. at 572. Prior to
his admittance at the optometry school, the college had examined him and had
determined that he could succeed in the field. See id. During the first year at the
college, the school required students to pass certain proficiency tests. See Doherty,
862 F.2d at 572-73. Due to his disability, the plaintiff was unable to meet these
requirements. See id. He was also unsuccessful in attempting to have the Admis-
sions Committee waive them. See id.
40. See id. at 575.
41. See id. In the lower court, the district court had stated that the law does
not require a program to accommodate a person through a waiver when the "fail-
ure to meet that requirement poses potential danger to the public." Doherty v.
Southern College of Optometry, 659 F. Supp. 662, 673 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
42. See Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir.
1988).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
44. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407, 410
(1979) (deeming certain physical qualifications as necessary requirements that
handicapped person had to meet in order to qualify for program).
1998]
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Community College v. Davis, the Supreme Court allowed the college
to deny admission to a hearing-impaired individual because hear-
ing was a necessary physical qualification. 45 Therefore, a program
may exclude a plaintiff who cannot meet certain physical require-
ments, but it may not exclude anyone solely due to a disability, pro-
vided the plaintiff can meet that program's necessary requirements.
Finally, the plaintiff must show that the program receives fed-
eral financial assistance.46 This requirement makes the Rehabilita-
tion Act inapplicable to many programs. 47 For example, private
employers that do not receive federal aid of any sort would not be
bound by Rehabilitation Act regulations. In an attempt to regulate
these situations, Congress has provided additional legislation to
supplement the Rehabilitation Act.4 8
2. Americans with Disabilities Act
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) to help remedy still-existing discrimination against the dis-
abled. 49 Among its purposes, the ADA seeks to provide a compre-
hensive plan to eliminate discrimination against the disabled with
the use of clear and consistent standards and guidelines. 50
45. Id. at 407-08. In Davis, the Court decided that in a nursing program's
clinical phase, the ability to hear and understand speech without depending on lip
reading was necessary for patient safety. Id. at 407. In such an environment, the
court noted that the individual could only function with close supervision. See id.
at 409. This necessary supervision would constitute a fundamental alteration to
the nature of a program. See id. at 410.
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act also allows
the plaintiff to show that the program is conducted by any Executive agency or by
the United States Postal Service. See id.
47. For a discussion of the limited coverage of the Rehabilitation Act in com-
parison to the ADA, see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of this additional legislation, see infra notes 49-74 and
accompanying text.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). Prior to the enactment of the Act, Congress
concluded that despite changes and improvements in society, individuals with disa-
bilities still face certain forms of discrimination. See id. § 12101(a)(2). Congress
recognized that current laws were insufficient to solve this problem of discrimina-
tion. See Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 907, 937 (1997). Discrimination
continued to exist in aspects of life such as employment, public accommodations,
public services, recreation and education. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (3). Congress
also noted that the nation should strive to "assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" for the disabled.
Id. § 12101 (a) (8).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (1)-(2).
[Vol. 5: p. 327
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While Congress may have intended the ADA to work in con-
junction with the Rehabilitation Act,5 1 the ADA clearly has a
broader scope, reaches more areas and, for all purposes, supersedes
the Rehabilitation Act.52 Title II of the ADA protects against dis-
crimination from public entities,53 and Title III extends the cover-
age to public accommodations and services operated by private
entities. 54
In the employment context, Title I of the ADA establishes that
an employer may not "discriminate against a qualified individual
51. See id. § 12201(a). "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards
applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or
the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title." Id.
52. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. This section states that:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a
disability shall by reason of such disability, be excluded from participa-
tion in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of
a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
Id.
Title I uses a different interpretation of "public entity" than the Rehabilitation
Act. See id. § 12131(1). Title II defines the term as "(A) any State or local govern-
ment; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumental-
ity of a state or states or local government; and (C) the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority." Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). This section states that:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.
Id.
An example of the ADA's extensive scope is in the recent district court deci-
sion on a summary judgment motion in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., No. CIV. 97-6309-
TC, 1998 WL 54998, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 30, 1998). In Martin, the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon examined whether the PGA Tour was
subject to compliance with the ADA. Id. at *1. The PGA Tour contended that it
was exempt from the ADA due to its operation as a private non-profit association.
See id. at *3. In the alternative, the PGA Tour argued that even if it was not ex-
empt, it does not constitute a place of public accommodation. See id. The district
court disagreed and concluded that the PGA Tour was not exempt from the ADA
because of its status as a commercial enterprise for the economic benefit of its
members. See id. at *3. Further, the Martin court noted that Title III defined "pub-
lic accommodation" to specifically include a golf course. Martin, 1998 WL 54988 at
*6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (K)). The court disregarded PGA Tour's argument
that the fairways and greens of golf courses during its tournaments are not places
of public accommodation by rejecting the idea of dual public/private zones. See
id. at *6-7. Accordingly, the court held that the PGA Tour operates a place of
public accommodation on the golf courses at which it conducts its tournaments.
See id. at *7.
For a discussion of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in Martin, see
infra note 74.
9
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with a disability because of the disability."55 Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act applies only to actions by programs that receive fed-
eral financial assistance. 5 6 By contrast, the ADA, in the
employment context, prohibits discrimination by employers who re-
tain fifteen or more employees regardless of whether or not they
receive federal funding.57 Congress intended this additional cover-
age to help remedy the problems that remained even after the Re-
habilitation Act's enactment.5 8
To prevail under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the plain-
tiff has a disability, (2) the plaintiff was qualified and (3) the plain-
tiff was denied either a reasonable accommodation for the disability
or was subject to an adverse decision made solely because of the
disability.59 For the most part, the analysis parallels claims that are
brought under the Rehabilitation Act.60
Under the first element, the plaintiff must prove that he or she
has a disability under the ADA. 61 Similar to the Rehabilitation Act,
the ADA defines a disability as a "physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such [an] individual. '62 Federal regulations define "major life ac-
tivities" as those involving the senses or routine daily activities. 63 A
plaintiff qualifies as having a "disability" under the Act if the impair-
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In the employment context, the ADA's general rule
is that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job ap-
plication procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employ-
ees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.
Id.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). This section states, in pertinent part, "[t]he
term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person
.... Id.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
59. See, e.g., Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 843'(6th Cir. 1996) (discuss-
ing factors of ADA claim).
60. See, e.g., Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177
(1996) (stating that analysis of ADA claims roughly coincide with Rehabilitation
Act claims).
61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182 (1994) (requiring individual to have disabil-
ity to qualify for its protection).
62. Id. § 12102(2) (A).
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1994) (including "functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working" as major life activities).
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ment substantially limits one or more of these major-life activities. 64
The test used to determine if an impairment "substantially limits" a
major life activity takes into account the nature and severity of the
impairment, its expected duration and the long-term or expected
long-term impact.65 Under this definition of a "disability," an im-
pairment that does not substantially hinder or affect daily activities
or senses does not constitute a disability under the ADA.66
The second part of the ADA analysis requires that the plaintiff
be a "qualified individual."67 Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the
ADA provides statutory definitions of what constitutes a "qualified
individual."68 The ADA uses the term to mean a person who, "with
or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the necessary
functions of the employment position '69 or meets the essential eli-
gibility requirements in the public services context. 70
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A).
65. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2).
66. See Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1996). In Roush, the
plaintiff brought an ADA claim against her employer, alleging that the employer
violated her rights by failing to grant her further excused medical leave. Id. at 842.
The plaintiff had a kidney condition that required her to take a medical leave in
1991 to undergo a pyeloplasty operation. See id. In 1992, the plaintiff underwent
further bi-monthly treatments to treat her bladder condition. See id. The defend-
ant denied her request for excused leave for these treatments. See id. The plaintiff
was forced to take unexcused time off and claimed that she was then subject to
discipline. See Roush, 96 F.3d at 842.
The plaintiff claimed that her kidney and bladder condition constituted a dis-
ability under the ADA since it substantially limited her ability to work, which is a
major life activity. See id. at 843. On a motion for summary judgment, the Sixth
Circuit, however, concluded that no evidence existed that the kidney impairment
substantially limited a major life activity as defined by the ADA. See id. at 844. The
Roush court determined that "since the kidney condition was temporary, it is not
substantially limiting and, therefore, is not a disability." Id. With regard to the
bladder condition, the court found an existing genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the condition limited her working. See id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (employment context); id. § 12132 (public
services).
The ADA does not use the term "qualified individual" for places of public
accommodation operated by private entities under Title III. See id. § 12182(a).
Instead, Title III only prohibits discrimination from "full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations . . ." Id.
68. See id. § 12111(8) (employment context); id. § 12131(2) (1994) (public
services).
69. Id. § 12111(8).
70. See id. § 12131(2). The section states, in pertinent part, that a qualified
individual means "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility re-
quirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity." Id.
1998]
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In analyzing this second factor, courts must determine whether
a reasonable accommodation would make the person qualified. 71
If a reasonable accommodation is possible but the employer, pro-
gram or service does not implement the accommodation, it may be
denying the individual solely on the basis of the disability.72 The
test, which resembles the "reasonable" test used for the Rehabilita-
tion Act, deems a modification unreasonable and an undue hard-
ship upon the program if it fundamentally changes the nature of
the program.73 Under the ADA, to avoid having to make an accom-
modation, an employer, program or service must demonstrate that
a modification would result in a fundamental alteration. Conse-
quently, cases involving athletic eligibility requirements often re-
volve on whether the court deems a waiver to be a fundamental
alteration or a reasonable modification.7 4
71. See id. § 12111(8) (allowing individual to be qualified with reasonable ac-
commodation in employment context); id. § 12131(2) (permitting individual to
be qualified with reasonable accommodation in public services context); id.
§ 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii) (prohibiting, for public accommodations owned by private
entities, "a failure to make reasonable modifications in polices, practices, or proce-
dures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such ... accommodations
to individuals with disabilities, unless ... making such modifications would funda-
mentally alter the nature of such .. . accommodations being offered").
The implementing regulation for public entities requires those entries to
make reasonable modifications when they are necessary to avoid discrimination
due to a disability unless "making the modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7) (1997).
72. See supra note 71.
73. See supra note 71.
74. See infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text; cf. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.,
No. 97-6309-TC, 1998 WL 67529 at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 1998).
The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in Martin discussed
the application of ADA requirements to a professional sports organization such as
the PGA. Id. In Martin, the plaintiff, who was a disabled golfer, petitioned the
PGA Tour for the use of a golf cart during PGA tournaments pursuant to a reason-
able modification under the ADA. Id. at *1. PGA Tour asserted that the ADA did
not apply to its tournaments. See id. at *2. Further, PGA Tour argued that even if
the ADA did apply, waiving the organization's walking requirement during its
events would be a fundamental alteration of a necessary requirement. See id. The
district court dismissed the first argument and held that the ADA applied to the
PGA and its tournaments. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., No. CIV. 97-6309-TC, 1998
WL 54998 (D. Or. Jan. 30, 1998).
The court then examined whether requiring a waiver of the cart rule was a
reasonable accommodation or a fundamental alteration that would result in an
undue hardship to the PGA. See Martin, 1998 WL 67529, at *2. It determined that
the use of a cart was a reasonable accommodation. See id. at *6. At the senior PGA
Tour and the Qualifying School Tournament, two of the four tours that the PGA
stages, the PGA permits the use of carts with no penalty. See id. This permitted use
of a cart worked against PGA Tour's contention that walking was a necessary re-
quirement that injected an important element of fatigue in shot-making. See id.
The Martin court examined whether the modification would result in a funda-
mental alteration. Id. at *7. It concluded that allowing a cart was not a fundamen-
tal alteration. See Martin, 1998 WL 67529, at *12. Martin can no longer walk a golf
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B. Athletic Eligibility Regulations
1. Age and semester-based athletic eligibility requirements
High school athletic eligibility rules, promulgated by athletic
associations, seek to regulate the qualifications of participants in
interscholastic sports. 75 Athletic associations intend these regula-
tions to negate anti-academic tendencies and practices used by ath-
letic programs who try to gain competitive advantages. 76
One of the practices targeted by associations is "redshirting.' 77
Redshirting occurs when a school holds a student back academi-
cally in order to develop and improve the student's athletic abil-
ity. 7 8 While the student spends an extra year in school, his or her
maximum allowable time to compete in sports is not affected. 79
The theory behind the practice is that an extra year of competition
will increase a student's athletic maturity, enhance his or her per-
formance and allow the team to be more competitive. 80 To help
eliminate this practice, athletic associations have enacted eligibility
course due to his disability. See id. at *1. The court did not consider the walking
rule's purported purpose of adding fatigue to shot-making to be as significant as
other factors such as dehydration. See id. at *8. Further, the court pointed out that
at least some of the PGA's rules are alterable. See id. at *10-12. The PGA accom-
modates blind golfers by allowing a coach and a modification of the advice rules.
See id. at *10-11. In the case of a blind golfer, the court noted that the PGA Tour
must also conduct an individualized assessment to determine if the golfer qualifies
for the rules modifications. See Martin, 1998 WL 67529, at *12. The court analo-
gized Martin's situation to that of the current modifications available for blind
golfers and concluded that the requested accommodation was reasonable. See id.
75. See CHAMPION, supra note 1, § 16.7 (1990) (explaining purposes of athletic
eligibility rules).
Athletic associations are established by states on an individual basis. See
WONG, supra note 4, at 188. All fifty states have high school athletic associations
that cover, in varying degrees, a state's interscholastic athletic programs. See id. at
185, 187. Generally, high school athletic associations consist of high schools within
a state that agree to compete in association events while following rules and regula-
tions. See id. at 185. Athletic associations are primarily responsible for promulgat-
ing and enforcing the eligibility regulations for student athletes. See id. at 240.
76. See CHAMPION, supra note 1, § 16.7 (1990). Athletic associations enact eli-
gibility rules to promote amateur athletics and protect student athletes. See WONG,
supra note 4, at 240. If students do not meet eligibility standards, athletic associa-
tions may penalize the athlete, team and/or school for a team's use of an ineligible
athlete. See id.
77. See WONG, supra note 4, at 275. Athletic associations also target other
practices such as recruitment of transfer students and drug use, as well as establish-
ing requirements pertaining to grade point average and academic progress. See id.
at 240.
78. See CHAMPION, supra note 1, § 16.7 (1990).
79. See WONG, supra note 4, at 275.
80. See Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 929
(8th Cir. 1994) (mentioning discouragement of students from delaying education
to gain athletic maturity as one reason for age limits).
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regulations that discourage the placement of athletics over academ-
ics.8s Commonly, the regulations that limit redshirting are the
maximum age rule and the maximum semester rule.8 2 These rules
seek to "reduce the competitive advantage flowing to teams using
older athletes" and to "protect[ ] younger athletes from harm" as
well as to restore academics as the top priority over athletics.8 3
The first option for students who are rendered ineligible pur-
suant to these regulations is to challenge their status by requesting
a waiver or hardship exception. 4 Often, athletic associations per-
mit a waiver of some or all of their regulations if cause is shown.8 5
The second option for students is to file suit in court to obtain an
injunction permitting them to play.8 6
81. For common examples of athletic eligibility regulations, see infra note 82.
82. See CHAMPION, supra note 1, § 16.7 (1990 & Supp. 1996). Maximum age
rules usually prohibit the participation in interscholastic sports of anyone who has
turned nineteen. See id. A few states, such as Maine and North Dakota, extend the
limit to age twenty. See APPENZELLER, supra note 5, at 143-44. Maximum semester
rules declare a student athletically ineligible after eight semesters spent in high
school. See CHAMPION, supra note 1, § 16.7 (1990 & Supp. 1996).
For examples of cases involving maximum age rules, see Johnson v. Florida
High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997); Sandison v. Michi-
gan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); Pottgen v. Mis-
souri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994); Dennin v.
Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn.), va-
cated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996); Reaves v. Mills, 904 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y.
1995); Booth v. University Interscholastic League, No. Civ. A-90-CA-764, 1990 WL
484414, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1990); Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F.
Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982); University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848
S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). For an example of a credit hour requirement
rule, which requires a minimum number of credit hours in the student's previous
semester, see Hoot v. Milan Area Schs., 853 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
83. Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 929; see also WONG, supra note 4, at 277-78 (noting that
regulations prohibiting redshirting seek to prevent "competition between individu-
als with vast differences in strength, speed, and experience" and promote player
safety).
An additional reason for redshirting regulations is to prevent older athletes
from taking the space of other younger athletes on teams with limited squad size.
See id. at 282.
84. See, e.g., Hoot, 853 F. Supp. at 245. In Hoot, the school superintendent
requested a waiver of athletic eligibility requirements from the MHSAA for the
plaintiff, who had a disability. See id. The plaintiff did not meet a minimum credit
hour requirement. See id. The MHSAA subsequently denied the waiver request.
See id.
85. See, e.g., MHSAA CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, § 4(E). In the Michigan High
School Athletic Association, the Executive Committee "shall have the authority to
set aside the effect of any regulation governing eligibility of students" except with
regard to age "when in its opinion the rule fails to accomplish the purpose for
which it is intended, or when the rule works an undue hardship upon the student
or school." Id.
86. For a sampling of cases involving the attempts of disabled students to par-
ticipate in sports by trying to obtain an injunction in court, see supra note 5.
[Vol. 5: p. 327
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss2/5
MAXIMUM SEMESTER RULES FOR ATHLETES
Students who obtain an injunction in court must be wary of a
possible reversal of the decision. For example, athletic associations
may have retroactive punishment rules that would penalize the stu-
dent or school district for the use of a player later deemed ineligi-
ble.8 7 Courts have treated retroactive action by athletic associations
with differing results.8
8
In Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic
Association,89 a student with a disability sought and obtained a re-
straining order that allowed him to play on his basketball team de-
spite violating an age eligibility rule.90 This order also enjoined the
MHSAA from punishing either the student or the school for his
participation in sports. 91 While the student played in a number of
games, he was not a starting player and did not contribute materi-
ally to any victories. 92 The MHSAA eventually prevailed on the
merits, but both the state circuit court and the state court of ap-
peals ruled that the MHSAA could not assess penalties in retro-
In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a district court must
consider four factors: "(1) whether the movant has a 'strong' likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer irreparable injury;
(3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to
others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of a
preliminary injunction." Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1030 (citing USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy, 689 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1982)).
If a district court issues a preliminary injunction, a court of appeals will use an
abuse of discretion standard of review to determine whether to uphold the injunc-
tion. See In re Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 1992). Under
this standard, the court of appeals reviews the district court's findings of fact for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See id. Either a legal or factual error
is sufficient to result in an abuse of discretion. See id.
87. See, e.g., MHSAA HANDBOOK, Regulation V, § 4(C). This regulation states
that if a player is permitted to play due to a court order or injunction and that
injunction is subsequently vacated, stayed, reversed or unjustified, then the MH-
SAA may still take action pursuant to its other regulations. See id.
88. See infra notes 89-117 and accompanying text.
89. 467 N.W.2d 21 (Mich. 1991).
90. Id. at 23. The student, John McClellan, was a senior at Cardinal Mooney
High School during the 1987-88 school year. See id. McClellan had turned 19
before September 1, 1987, which made him ineligible to participate in interscho-
lastic athletics under MHSAA regulations. See id. In the fall of 1987, special educa-
tion counselors at Cardinal Mooney High School determined that McClellan, who
had previously attended a school for the emotionally handicapped, would benefit
from playing on the school's varsity basketball team. See id. As a result, Cardinal
Mooney High School and McClellan's family challenged the age-eligibility rule's
application to McClellan. See id. at 23. The court issued a temporary restraining
order that prevented the MHSAA from enforcing the rule against McClellan and
from penalizing Cardinal Mooney High School. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. During the previous school year, McClellan also participated on
the basketball team as a reserve player. See id.
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spect.93 The Michigan Supreme Court considered the retrospective
punishment rule 94 and upheld its validity.95 It based its decision to
uphold the rule partly upon the agreement of MHSAA member
schools to submit to regulations as a condition to association
membership. 96
The case of Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association,
Inc.97 supported the ability of athletic associations to retroactively
punish school districts when the student is later deemed ineligible.
In Sandison, two students obtained temporary restraining orders
and injunctions that permitted their participation in sports despite
exceeding the athletic association's age limit.98 The injunction also
prevented the MHSAA from imposing penalties upon either the
students or the school district.99 In its review of the district court's
decision after the students had graduated from high school, the
Sixth Circuit determined that while the case was not "capable of
93. See id. at 23. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision
with regard to the punishment of Cardinal Mooney High School. See id. It held
that allowing punishment would cause the temporary restraining order to be
meaningless and would penalize the school for using the judicial system. See id.
(citing Cardinal Mooney High Sch. v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 445
N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)).
94. Rule 3(D) of the MHSAA provided:
If a student is ineligible according to MHSAA rules but is permitted to
participate in interscholastic competition contrary to such MHSAA rules
but in accordance with the terms of a court restraining order or injunc-
tion against his/her school and/or the MHSAA and said injunction is
subsequently voluntarily vacated, stayed, reversed or finally determined
by the courts that injunctive relief is not or was not justified, then any one
or more of the following actions shall be taken against such school in the
interest of restitution and fairness to the competing schools:
(1) -Require that individual or team records and performances
achieved during participation by such ineligible student shall be vacated
or stricken.
(2) -Require that team victories shall be forfeited to opponent.
(3) -Require that team or individual awards earned by such ineligible
student be returned to the association.
MHSAA HANDBOOK, Regulation V, § 3(D) (cited in Cardinal Mooney High Sch. v.
Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 467 N.W.2d 21, 22-23 (Mich. 1991)).
In 1991, this rule was codified in MHSAA Handbook, Regulation V as rule
3(D). Currently, the rule exists as rule 4(B) and 4(C). For the text of the current
rule, which retains virtually the same text as the former rule, see infra note 168.
95. See Cardinal Mooney High Sch. v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 467
N.W.2d 21, 24 (Mich. 1991).
96. See id.
97. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995). For an in-depth discussion and treatment of
Sandison, see generally, Jason L. Thomas, Note, Through the ADA and the Rehabilita-
tion Act, High School Athletes Are Saying "Put Me in Coach " Sandison v. Michigan High
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 727 (1997).
98. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1029. For a factual summary of the background, see
infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
99. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1029.
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repetition," the decision ordering the MHSAA to refrain from pun-
ishing the high schools was not moot. 100 The court based this deci-
sion on the interest retained by the students in preventing the
MHSAA from erasing their teams' records and performances. 10 1
After determining that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on
the merits of their claims, the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision
enjoining the MHSAA from penalizing the schools for the students'
performance. 102
Despite these holdings, other courts have refused to allow ret-
roactive punishment by athletic associations.10 3 In Crocker v. Tennes-
see Secondary School Athletic Association,10 4 the Sixth Circuit prohibited
an athletic association from imposing penalties upon a high
school.10 5 In Crocker, a student obtained an injunction to play de-
spite a "transfer" regulation that prohibited students who trans-
ferred from one high school from playing certain sports for a
year.1 6 This injunction also prohibited the athletic association
from penalizing the high school for the student's participation.1 0 7
100. Id. at 1029-30. The "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception
to mootness applies in cases where the case could not be litigated due to the short
duration of the challenged action, but where the complaining party has a reason-
able expectation of being subjected to the same action in the future. See id. at 1030
(citing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)). The Sandison court concluded
that the case did not fall within this exception since the plaintiffs had already grad-
uated from high school and would not be subjected to the same action in the
future. Id.
101. See id.
102. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1037. For a discussion of the ADA and Rehabili-
tation claims of the Sandison plaintiffs, see infra notes 140-46 and accompanying
text.
103. See Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 102 F.3d 1172
(1 th Cir. 1997) (holding no case or controversy existed between student and ath-
letic association after student's graduation); Jordan v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 16 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 1994) (enjoining athletic association from acting
against school's use of potentially ineligible athlete); Crocker v. Tennessee Secon-
dary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 89-6450, 1990 WL 104036, at *1 (6th Cir. July 25,
1990) (preventing athletic association from penalizing high school which com-
plied with district court order). But see Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1037 (reversing lower
court decision which prohibited penalizing schools for students' performance);
Cardinal Mooney High Sch. v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 467 N.W.2d 21
(Mich. 1991) (upholding retrospective punishment rule).
104. No. 89-6450, 1990 WL 104036, at *1 (6th Cir. July 25, 1990).
105. Id.
106. Id at *2. The plaintiff, Michael Crocker, had transferred during his
tenth grade year from Ezell-Harding Christian School to McGavock High School.
See id. at *1. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA) regula-
tions rendered transfer students ineligible to participate in football, basketball,
baseball, and track for a period of one year. TSSAA Article II, § 13 (discussed in
Crocker, 1990 WL 104036, at *1). Crocker wanted to play football at his new high
school. See Crocker, 1990 WL 104036, at *2.
107. See Crocker, 1990 WL 104036 at *2.
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While the Sixth Circuit vacated the case as moot, it prohibited pun-
ishment of the student's high school since the school was only com-
plying with a district court order.108
Other courts prevented penalizing school districts by claiming
that no issue between the parties remained to be resolved. 109 This
argument relies on the "case or controversy" requirement for fed-
eral court jurisdiction. 110 In Jordan v. Indiana High School Athletic
Association (IHSAA),"' the Seventh Circuit ruled that the athletic
association was unable to take action against a high school's use of a
potentially ineligible athlete. 1 2 While the athletic association had a
rule allowing the imposition of retroactive penalties," 3 the court
ruled that the association could not do so since the high school was
no longer a party to the suit. 1 1 4 The court ruled that no live contro-
versy existed between Jordan and the IHSAA since Jordan had al-
ready graduated."15  In Johnson v. Florida High School Activities
Association, Inc.,116 the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Jordan in ruling that no case or controversy existed
between the student and the athletic association after the student
graduated. 17
108. See id. at *4 (stating that "[i]t would be unfair to penalize McGavock
High School for actions that it took in compliance with a District Court order
during the pendency of that order").
109. See Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 102 F.3d 1172,
1173 (lth Cir. 1997);Jordan v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 16 F.3d 785, 787-
88 (7th Cir. 1994). For a discussion of Johnson, see infta notes 116-17 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of Jordan, see infra notes 111-15 and accompanying
text.
110. Article III of the United States Constitution requires that federal courts
possess jurisdiction to hear actual cases or controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1.
111. 16 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 1994).
112. Id. at 788-89. The plaintiff, Herman Jordan, had challenged a maximum
semester regulation that rendered him ineligible after he had transferred from
Marshall High School to Snider High School. See id. at 786. Jordan sought and
obtained a permanent injunction preventing the IHSAA from prohibiting his par-
ticipation. See id. at 786-87.
113. See IHSAA Rule 17-6 (cited in Jordan, 16 F.3d at 788). This rule allows
the IHSAA "to impose retroactive penalties on student athletes (and their schools)
who are declared ineligible by the IHSAA but are permitted to participate in inter-
scholastic competition in accordance with a court restraining order or injunction."
Id.
114. See Jordan, 16 F.3d at 788. Whereas the IHSAA had appealed the district
court's decision, Snider High School had not appealed the decision. Id. at 787.
115. See id. at 787-88.
116. 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997).
117. Id. at 1173. In Johnson, the plaintiff, DennisJohnson, exceeded the maxi-
mum age limit imposed by the Florida High School Activities Association (FHSAA)
and was ineligible to participate in football and wrestling. Id. Johnson sought and
obtained an injunction against enforcement of the age rule and a regulation that
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2. Application of regulations to disabled student-athletes
In recent years, several student athletes who claim to have disa-
bilities have asserted Rehabilitation Act and ADA rights in order to
participate in sports. 118 These claims frequently involved a student
with a disability exceeding the maximum age regulation but con-
tending that his or her rights under the Rehabilitation Act or ADA
are relevant. 1 9 As with all Rehabilitation Act or ADA claims, a stu-
dent must demonstrate that he or she is otherwise qualified and
that a waiver is a reasonable modification.' 20 Courts have split as to
whether or not the Rehabilitation Act and ADA apply and allow a
waiver. 121
In Hoot v. Milan Area Schools,122 the district court for the East-
ern District of Michigan addressed the "otherwise qualified" re-
quirement of a Rehabilitation Act and ADA claim in denying an
athletic association's motion for summary judgment. 23 The plain-
tiff sought an injunction to allow him to participate in athletics de-
spite failing to meet a minimum credit hour enrollment
requirement.1 24 The plaintiff was a poor student with behavioral
problems and was later diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperac-
tivity Disorder (ADHD).125 In considering the association's motion
for summary judgment, the district court discussed the "otherwise
could penalize the school for allowing his participation. See id. Johnson played
football and subsequently graduated from high school. See id. The FHSAA con-
tended that the case was not moot since it could still enforce penalties against Boca
Ciega High School, Johnson's high school. See Johnson, 102 F.3d at 1173. Boca
Ciega High School, however, was never a party to the case or appeal. See id.
118. See supra note 5.
119. See id.
120. See supra notes 27-42 & 67-73 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 122-52 and accompanying text.
122. 853 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
123. Id. at 249-50.
124. See id. at 245. The plaintiff, Raymond Hoot, had been denied participa-
tion in football by the school superintendent for failure to meet MHSAA Hand-
book Regulation I, § 7(a)'s requirement of enrollment in twenty credit hours of
work for the last semester. See id.
125. See id. at 244-45. Throughout high school, Hoot had continuous behav-
ior problems in the classroom. See Hoot, 853 F. Supp. at 245. During his third year,
Hoot's disruptive behavior led to his suspension from school for 21 days. See id.
Hoot's grade point average at the end of his third year was 0.981 out of a possible
4.0, while earning only 9.5 out of a possible 19 scholastic credits. See id. Despite
his academic performance, previous psychological and special education testing in
his first three years of school revealed no learning disability and actually concluded
that Hoot had the ability to succeed academically. See id.
In the summer of 1993, before Hoot's fourth year, the school principal de-
clared Hoot ineligible for athletic competition. See id. In the same summer, he
was also diagnosed with ADHD. See Hoot, 853 F. Supp. at 245.
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qualified" requirement. 126 In applying the test of whether a plain-
tiff is able to meet all of a program's necessary requirements in
spite of the handicap, the court refused to conclude that a jury
would certainly find that the plaintiff was not "otherwise quali-
fied."1 2 7 The court relied on the plaintiff's assertion that he was
"otherwise qualified" since he was a capable athlete who would be
qualified to play if not for his disability.' 28
While Hoot did not fully decide whether or not a disabled stu-
dent-athlete was "otherwise qualified," the Eighth Circuit in Pottgen
v. Missouri State High School Activities Association129 determined that a
disabled student who exceeded a maximum age limit was not a
"qualified individual." °3 0 In Pottgen, a student, who had to repeat
two grades in elementary school due to an undiagnosed learning
disability, challenged the athletic association regulation that ren-
dered him ineligible before his senior season due to his age. 1 1 The
Sixth Circuit considered the district court's grant of an injunction
and determined that Pottgen was not an "otherwise qualified" indi-
vidual. 132 In its Rehabilitation Act analysis, the court required a
plaintiff to meet a program's necessary or essential requirements. 133
The court considered an age limit to be an "essential" requirement
and noted that the plaintiff would never be able to meet it.'3 With
regard to the ADA claim, the court again considered the age limit
to be an essential requirement and that Pottgen could not meet the
requirement without modification. 135
A student may also meet the "otherwise qualified" requirement
if he or she can do so after a reasonable modification.' 36 A reason-
able modification does not require a program or institution to
126. See id. at 249-50.
127. See id. at 250.
128. See id.
129. 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
130. Id. at 929-31.
131. See id. at 927-28. The plaintiff, Edward Pottgen, had turned 19 before his
senior year. The state activities association prohibited students who had reached
19 before July 1 from participating in sports for the following school year(s). See
id. at 928.
132. See id. at 929-31.
133. See Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 929 (citing Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d
316, 321 (8th Cir. 1981)).
134. See Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 929-
30 (8th Cir. 1994). The court stated that waving an essential standard would be a
fundamental alteration of the program. See id. at 930.
135. See id. at 931.
136. See id. at 929.
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make substantial alterations.'3 7  The Pottgen court discussed
whether or not an age limit waiver was a reasonable accommoda-
tion and determined that it constituted a fundamental alteration in
the sports program.' 38 Consequently, the student was not "other-
wise qualified."'139
The result in Pottgen was echoed in the Sixth Circuit's holding
in Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc.140 In
Sandison, two students suffered from learning disabilities and had
each fallen behind the regular grade for students their age in
school.14 1 By their senior year, both students had exceeded the ath-
letic association's maximum age rule.' 42 After the district court
granted an injunction, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the finding that
the plaintiffs were "otherwise qualified" (under the Rehabilitation
Act analysis) or "qualified individuals" (under the ADA analysis). 143
The court followed Pottgen and held that since the age regulation is
a necessary requirement, waiver of the regulation was not reason-
able.144 Further, the court determined that the plaintiffs were not
excluded solely due to their disability, but were excluded solely be-
137. See id. at 930 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 413 (1979)). For a discussion of Davis, see supra notes 28-36 & 44-45 and
accompanying text.
138. See Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930.
139. See id. at 930-31.
140. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
141. Id. at 1028. The plaintiffs, Ronald Sandison and Craig Stanley, suffered
from learning disabilities that caused them to fall two years behind the typical
school grade for students their age. See id. Sandison had trouble processing
speech and language while Stanley had difficulty in mathematics. See id. Both also
ran on their respective high school's cross-country and track teams during their
first three years of high school. See id.
142. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1028. The maximum age rule provided that, "[a]
student who competes in any interscholastic athletic contests must be under
nineteen (19) years of age, except that a student whose nineteenth (19th) birthday
occurs on or after September 1 of a current school year is eligible for the balance
of that school year." MHSAA HANDBOOK, Regulation I, § 2 (reprinted in Sandison,
64 F.3d at 1029). Sandison's high school, Rochester Adams, and Stanley's high
school, Grosse Pointe North, are both MHSAA members that have agreed to adopt
and abide by MHSAA rules. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1028-29.
143. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1034-37. The plaintiffs had filed suit under the Re-
habilitation Act and ADA, as well as under the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act. See id. at 1029. The district
court granted a temporary restraining order that allowed them to run in upcoming
races. See id. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which was also
granted by the district court. See id. (citing Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Ath-
letic Ass'n, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994)).
144. See id. at 1034. The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that
the age rule was a necessary requirement. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035. The court
of appeals, however, ruled that the district court erred in finding that a waiver of
the age rule was a reasonable accommodation. See id.
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cause of their age. 145 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Rehabilita-
tion Act and ADA claims. 146
The district court in Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic
Conference, Inc. (CIAC), 147 maintained the opposite position, hold-
ing that handicapped students are "otherwise qualified" after a "rea-
sonable accommodation. '148 In Dennin, a student who had Down
Syndrome had exceeded the maximum age regulation due to spe-
cial education needs.' 49 In considering whether he was "otherwise
qualified," the court analyzed if a "reasonable accommodation"
would enable him to be "otherwise qualified."' 50 The court con-
cluded that a waiver of the rule for the plaintiff would not under-
mine the purposes of the CIAC rule since the plaintiff had no
145. See Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026,
1033 (6th Cir. 1995). In analyzing the plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act claim, the
court considered whether Regulation I, § 2 excluded the plaintiffs solely by reason
of their disability. See id. at 1031. The court characterized the regulation as a
neutral rule with respect to disability since the MHSAA neutrally applied the rule
to all students. See id. at 1032.
The court also disregarded the argument that the requirement violated a De-
partment of Education regulation implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. See id. at 1033-34. The Department regulation requires recipients of Depart-
ment funds that offer interscholastic athletics to "provide to qualified handicapped
students an equal opportunity for participation in these activities." 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.37(c)(1) (1997). The court ruled that the MHSAA did provide an equal
opportunity to participate in athletics and that the age restriction applied equally
to students with or without a disability. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1033-34.
146. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1037.
147. 913 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn.), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Second Circuit subsequently dismissed CIAC's appeal as moot and vacated the
district court'sjudgment for the purposes of dismissing the action. Dennin, 94 F.3d
at 102. For an in-depth treatment of Dennin, see Patricia A. Solfaro, Note, Civil
Rights - Courts Should Use an Individualized Analysis When Determining Whether to Grant
a Waiver of an Athletic Conference Age Eligibility Rule: Dennin v. Connecticut Inter-
scholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663 (2d Cir. 1996), 7 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 185 (1997).
148. Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 668-69,
149. Id. at 666. The plaintiff, Joseph Dennin, had spent four years in middle
school and began school at Trumbull High School at the age of sixteen. See id.
Dennin was a member of the swim team for his three previous years in high school
prior to his senior year. See id. Dennin's times were generally slow although his
relay teams sometimes scored points. See id.
CIAC eligibility rules prohibited athletes who had turned 19 on or before Sep-
tember 1 from competing in interscholastic sports. See Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 666.
Although his request for a waiver was denied by CIAC, he was allowed to swim as a
non-scoring swimmer. See id. This decision permitted Dennin to swim in all meets
but prevented him and his relay teams from earning points for Trumbull High
School. See id.
150. See id. at 668.
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competitive advantage.1 5 ' The district court then held that a rea-
sonable accommodation could be provided to him. 152
As these past cases show, courts are split on the applicability of
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to certain athletic eligibility
rules. 153 In considering a claim under the two acts, courts have ad-
dressed the appropriateness of an injunction, the relative mootness
of an appealed injunction, the question of whether students with
disabilities were "otherwise qualified" to play and the potential for
reasonable modifications that could allow a student to be "other-
wise qualified."1 54 The judicial split prevents a clear answer as to
whether the Rehabilitation Act and ADA provide students with disa-
bilities a basis for receiving a waiver of certain athletic eligibility
regulations.
III. FACTS OF McPITERSON v. MICIGAN HrIGT SChOOL
A ThLETIC ASSOCIA TION
During the 1993-94 school year, Dion McPherson joined the
varsity basketball team for the first time at Huron High School. 155
While McPherson was only a junior, the 1993-94 school year repre-
sented his seventh and eighth semesters in high school because he
repeated the eleventh grade due to poor academic performance. 156
Previously, McPherson had been unable to participate in sports due
to his failure to meet the minimum grade point average require-
ment of the Ann Arbor school district.1 57
At the beginning of his senior year in 1994, McPherson was
diagnosed with ADHD and a seizure disorder.' 58 He wanted to
151. See id. at 669. As with other eligibility rules, the purposes of CIAC's age
rule included deterring redshirting, protecting younger athletes and discouraging
students from delaying their education for athletics. See Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at
666. The court noted that Dennin was always the slowest swimmer, his education
had not been delayed and he was not a safety risk to anyone. See id. at 669.
152. See id. (noting that waiver would not be unduly burdensome administra-
tively on CIAC).
153. See supra notes 122-52 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 122-52 and accompanying text.
155. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 456.
156. See id.
157. See id. Huron High School is in the Ann Arbor school district. See id. at
455. This minimum grade point average requirement was imposed by the Ann
Arbor school district independent of any MHSAA regulations or requirements. See
id. at 456. During the 1993-94 school year, McPherson's grades improved enough
to meet the school district's minimum grade point average requirement, and he
became eligible to participate in sports. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 456.
158. See id. McPherson was classified as having a "specific learning disability."
Id. Prior to this school year, he had never been referred for special education
testing by the school. See id.
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compete in varsity basketball during the 1994-95 school year but he
had lost his eligibility under the Michigan High School Athletic As-
sociation (MHSAA) maximum semester rule. 159 Since the 1994-95
school year represented his ninth and tenth high school semesters,
McPherson was ineligible to participate in interscholastic sports.1 60
McPherson filed a request with the MHSAA for a waiver from
the maximum semester rule. 161 The MHSAA Constitution permits
such waivers of the maximum semester rule in certain limited cir-
cumstances. 162 After extensive consideration of his situation, the
MHSAA rejected McPherson's waiver request.163 In rejecting the
request, the MHSAA emphasized several factors. It noted that the
ADHD medical condition had never required a restriction of Mc-
159. See id. The MHSAA regulation states that "[a] student shall not compete
in any branch of athletics who has been enrolled in grades nine to twelve, inclu-
sive, for more than eight semesters." MHSAA HANDBOOK, Regulation I, § 4.
Some of the purposes of the eight semester rule include limiting athletic ex-
perience to balance the playing field for competitors, deterring of redshirting and
preserving academics as the primary function of schooling. See McPherson, 119 F.3d
at 456. MHSAA's assistant director testified that, in the absence of the rule, red-
shirting abuses would be common. See id.
Huron High School is a member of the MHSAA. See id. at 455. An MHSAA
member school must ensure that its athletes meet eligibility requirements in order
to participate in MHSAA events. See McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, Inc., 77 F.3d 883, 885 (6th Cir. 1996), rev'd en banc, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir.
1997). Further, the Ann Arbor school district has adopted and agreed to abide by
MHSAA regulations. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 455.
160. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 456.
161. See id.
162. MHSAA CONST., art. VII, § 4(E). The MHSAA Constitution states, in per-
tinent part:
Except for the eligibility rule in regard to age, the Executive Committee
shall have the authority to set aside the effect of any regulation governing
eligibility of students or the competition between schools when in its
opinion the rule fails to accomplish the purpose for which it is intended,
or when the rule works an undue hardship upon the student or school.
Id.
163. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 456-57. Initially, the Executive Committee was
reluctant to grant a waiver due to a lack of information on McPherson's physical
stature, athletic experience or ability. See id. at 456. The Executive Committee
expressed reservations about exceeding the maximum limits that were applied to
other students. See id. It also believed that granting the waiver could provide the
Ann Arbor Public Schools with an advantage that resulted from its failure to refer
McPherson for special education services in earlier years. See id. at 456. The MH-
SAA then requested further information from the school district to aid it in consid-
eration of the request. See id. at 457.
The MHSAA received information from Huron High School's athletic direc-
tor about McPherson's stature and ability. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 457. The
athletic director of Huron High School, Jane Bennett, noted that McPherson "was
less than average height and lower than average weight compared to not only
members of [the Huron] team but a good sample of [Huron] opponents" and that
he was "somewhere in the middle of the pack" in terms of ability. Id. The MHSAA
considered the information but rejected the request. See id.
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Pherson's course load. 164 The MHSAA also stressed the school dis-
trict's refusal to waive its own higher academic eligibility
standards. 16 5 In addition, the MHSAA concluded that his participa-
tion in games would affect both teammates and opponents. 166 Fi-
nally, the MHSAA believed that the decision would set an
unfavorable precedent. 167 Subsequently, McPherson filed a com-
plaint in the Eastern District of Michigan to enjoin the MHSAA
from prohibiting his participation in sports for Huron High School
and from penalizing the school district for his participation. 68 Mc-
Pherson argued that the MHSAA violated his rights under the ADA
and Rehabilitation Act. 169
In January 1995, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Michigan concluded that McPherson was likely to
succeed on his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.17 0 The court
164. See id.
165. See id. The Executive Committee believed that "[ilt [was] inappropriate
for the school district to request the athletic association to waive an eligibility re-
quirement for a fifth year senior when the school district had not waived its own
higher eligibility requirements .... ." McPherson, 119 F.3d at 457.
166. See id. The MHSAA noted that McPherson's participation would have a
detrimental effect on his high school team since it would reduce the playing time
of teammates who met and abided by eligibility regulations. See id. The MHSAA
also felt that McPherson's participation could adversely affect his opponents who
had met and abided by eligibility requirements due to his possible effect on the
outcome of contests. See id.
167. See id.
168. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 457-58. MHSAA Regulation V states, in perti-
nent part:
SECTION 4(B) - Accidental, intentional or other use of ineligible players
by a junior high/middle school or senior high school shall require that
team victories are forfeited to opponents; and any one or more of these
additional actions may be taken: (1) that individual or team records and
performances achieved during participation by such ineligibles be va-
cated or stricken; and (2) that team or individual awards earned by such
ineligibles be returned to the MHSAA.
SECTION 4(C) - If a student is ineligible according to MHSAA rules but
is permitted to participate in interscholastic competition contrary to such
MHSAA rules but in accordance with the terms of a court restraining
order or injunction against his/her school and/or the MHSAA, and that
injunction is subsequently voluntarily vacated, stayed, reversed or finally
determined by the courts that injunctive relief is not or was not justified
or expires without further judicial determination, those actions in SEC-
TION 4(B) shall be taken.
MHSAA HANDBOOK, Regulation V, §§ 4(B)-(C).
169. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 457-58. McPherson alleged violations of the
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act,
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 37.1101-.1160 (West 1985). See McPherson, 119 F.3d. at
457. For a general discussion of the ADA, see supra notes 49-74 and accompanying
text. For a general discussion of the Rehabilitation Act, see supra notes 17-48 and
accompanying text.
170. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458.
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issued a preliminary injunction allowing McPherson to play basket-
ball during the 1994-95 school year. 171 The injunction also prohib-
ited the MHSAA from penalizing the school district for allowing
McPherson's participation in sports.172 On appeal by the MHSAA
after the season, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit initially dismissed the case as moot.173 Upon a rehearing en
banc, the Sixth Circuit decided that the case was not moot and va-
cated the injunction. 174 The appellate court held that the ADA did
not compel the MHSAA to grant McPherson a waiver. 175 Further,
the Sixth Circuit determined that the Rehabilitation Act also did
not apply, because the Act has parallel requirements to the ADA.176
171. See id. McPherson played for the basketball team in the 1994-95 season,
but he did not prove to be much of an impact player for his team. See McPherson
v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, 77 F.3d 883, 886 (6th Cir. 1996),
rev'd en banc, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997). During the 1994-95 season, the Huron
High School basketball team compiled a 3-18 record, including 0-6 in its league.
See id.
172. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458.
173. See McPherson, 77 F.3d at 887. CircuitJudge Oakes, for the majority, first
considered whether the appeal met the case or controversy requirement with re-
spect to the injunction allowing his participation. See id. at 886. The court noted
that McPherson had graduated from high school and concluded that he no longer
had an interest in the challenged rule. See id. The court held that McPherson's
graduation from high school eliminated the controversy requirement with respect
to the injunction permitting his participation in athletics. See id.
Circuit Judge Oakes then considered the part of the injunction pertaining to
possible punishment of McPherson's high school for allowing his participation in
sports during the injunction. See id. The court noted but dismissed MHSAA's ar-
gument that Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc. had de-
cided the issue. See McPherson, 77 F.3d at 887. See also supra notes 140-46 and
accompanying text. Accordingly, the court held that the MHSAA could not penal-
ize the school district since the school was only following the district court's pre-
liminary injunction. See McPherson, 77 F.3d at 887. In support of its position, the
court reasoned that had the school not followed the injunction, it would have been
acting in contempt of a judicial proceeding. See id.
174. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458, 464. A majority of the judges in the Sixth
Circuit voted for a rehearing of the case en banc. See McPherson v. Michigan
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 90 F.3d 129, 129 (6th Cir.), vacating 773 F.3d 883 (6th
Cir. 1996). By granting a rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit vacated its prior
judgment and restored the case to the docket. See id.
175. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 462-63.
176. See id. at 463. The Rehabilitation Act requires the additional qualifica-
tion of federal funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). For an in-depth comparison of
the two acts, see generally, Weber, supra note 19.
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Circuit Judge Ryan, writing for the majority in McPherson, con-
sidered the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA to the
MHSAA's maximum semester rule. 177 First, the majority examined
whether the case was possibly moot.178 Next, the court analyzed the
issuance of the preliminary injunction beginning with McPherson's
ADA claim. 179 Finally, Judge Ryan briefly discussed the plaintiffs
rights under the Rehabilitation Act.180
The majority began its inquiry by discussing whether the case
was moot."" As in Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Associa-
tion, Inc., the majority noted that the controversy regarding whether
McPherson should be allowed to compete, which was originally ad-
dressed in the preliminary injunction, no longer existed since the
season was over.18 2 Further, the court followed Sandison in dis-
missing the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception
since the complaining party had graduated from high school and
would not be subject to the same action.183
Despite these factors, the majority concluded that the case was
not moot since both parties retained an interest.184 The court
177. McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458-63.
178. See id. at 458-59.
179. See id. at 459-63.
180. See id. at 463.
181. See id. at 458. Neither party had specifically addressed the issue in their
briefs. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458. The court, however, recognized that it did
not have jurisdiction over the case unless an actual case or controversy existed. See
id. (citing Crane v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir.
1992)).
In Crane v. Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA), the Seventh Circuit
heard a similar case involving a student who had been declared ineligible from
varsity sports for one year. 975 F.2d 1315, 1317-18 (7th Cir. 1992). By the time the
case reached the appellate level, the year had ended, and the injunction had ex-
pired. See id. at 1318. In discussing whether the case was moot, the court recog-
nized that its jurisdiction, under the U.S. Constitution, extended only to "actual
cases and controversies." Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the case was not moot because a justiciable controversy remained
concerning the interest of the IHSAA in imposing retroactive penalties on student
athletes and their schools. See id.
182. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458; Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1029 (6th Cir. 1995).
183. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458; Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1029-30 (rejecting
"capable of repetition yet evading review" exception, since same complaining party
would not be subject to same action again).
184. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458.
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found that McPherson's remaining interest stemmed from his re-
quest in the complaint that the MHSAA refrain from taking any
action penalizing the school district for his participation.18 5 On the
other side, the MHSAA specifically requested the Sixth Circuit to
reverse the district court's injunction, thereby permitting the MH-
SAA to strike the records of McPherson and his team.186 Using the
reasoning in Sandison and Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activi-
ties Association, the court concluded that both parties maintained a
legal interest in the MHSAA's request for a reversal of the
injunction.1 8 7
After determining that the case was not moot, the majority ex-
amined the issuance of the injunction. 8 8 The majority began its
review of the injunction by examining McPherson's ADA claim.
Judge Ryan noted that ADA claims roughly parallel Rehabilitation
Act claims with the exception of the requirement of federal fund-
ing under the Rehabilitation Act.189 Under the ADA claim, the ma-
jority offered two avenues for the plaintiff to follow in order to
demonstrate discrimination: (1) offering evidence that learning dis-
abilities were actually considered and discriminated against by the
MHSAA in formulating its maximum semester rule or (2) showing
that MHSAA could have, but did not, reasonably accommodate Mc-
Pherson's disability. 19 0
The court disregarded the first avenue since the plaintiff did
not even suggest, nor present evidence, that the MHSAA imple-
mented its maximum semester rule with the motivation of barring
disabled students from participation in sports.1 1 After dismissing
185. See id.
186. See id. at 458-59.
187. See id. at 459; Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64
F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that plaintiffs "still have an interest in
preventing the MHSAA from erasing their teams' victories and their own perform-
ances"); Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 928 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding live controversy existed for part of injunction prohibiting ath-
letic association from penalizing high school).
188. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 459. In considering the preliminary injunc-
tion, the court used the abuse of discretion standard that it had used in Sandison.
See id. (citing Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1030).
189. See id. at 459-60. The court stated that "[i]t is well-established that the
two statutes are quite similar in purpose and scope." Id. at 459. The court also
emphasized that ADA standards apply in analyzing Rehabilitation Act cases. See id.
at 460 (citing Burns v. City of Columbus, 91 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1996)).
190. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 460.
191. See id. The court used its reasoning in Sandison to conclude that the
regulation is neutral with respect to disability. See id. (citing Sandison, 64 F.3d at
1032). In Sandison, the court had concluded that the passage of time, not the
disability, was responsible for the students not being able to meet the age require-
ment. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1033.
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the first theory, the court focused on whether the MHSAA could
have reasonably accommodated McPherson. 192 The majority found
that the only possible accommodation for McPherson would be a
complete waiver of the regulation. 193 In focusing on a waiver as the
only possible accommodation, the court examined whether this was
a reasonable modification. 194 First, the court considered its prior
ruling in Sandison that a maximum age eligibility regulation was a
necessary requirement. 195 McPherson argued that a fundamental
difference existed between the maximum age rule in Sandison and
the maximum semester rule in the present case because waivers on
semester limits are permissible, while age limit waivers are prohib-
ited.196 The plaintiff reasoned that because the rule could not be
considered necessary, the MHSAA would have no burden in waiv-
ing the requirement as a reasonable accommodation.1 97 In arguing
that the requirement was necessary, the MHSAA provided evidence
of potential redshirt abuses that could arise without the rule.1 98
Further, the MHSAA noted that one of the rule's purposes was to
ensure that academics took precedence over athletics in school.1 99
Regardless of the availability of a waiver, the majority found no
meaningful distinction between the purpose of the age limit rule
and that of the maximum semester rule that would make the for-
mer necessary but not the latter.200 Since it determined that the
semester rule was a necessary requirement, the majority next ex-
amined whether or not waiver of the rule would be a fundamental
alteration or a reasonable accommodation. 2°1 In asking for a
waiver based on an individual case assessment, the plaintiffs posi-
tion was that McPherson was of less than average height, weight and
192. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461.
193. See id. The court depended on its analysis in Sandison for its determina-
tion that a complete waiver was the only possible accommodation. See id. (citing
Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir.
1995)).
194. See id. at 461.
195. See id. (citing Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64
F.3d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir. 1995)).
196. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461. The MHSAA Constitution allows a waiver
for any eligibility rule except for age. MHSAA CONST., art. VII, § 4(E). For the
text of the complete provision, see supra note 162.
197. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461. In the past, the MHSAA has granted waiv-
ers of the maximum semester rule. See id.
198. See id. at 462.
199. See id. The MHSAA argued that the rule was "essential to preserving the
philosophy that students attend school primarily for the classroom education and
only secondarily to participate in interscholastic athletics." Id.
200. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461.
201. See id. at 461-62.
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skill in comparison to teammates and competitors. 2 0 2 Further, the
plaintiff also noted that since the MHSAA had granted waivers in
the past, requiring a waiver in this case was reasonable. 20 3 The MH-
SAA argued that if a waiver was required under the circumstances,
the court would be imposing a substantial financial burden on the
association. 20 4 The court used its reasoning in Doherty v. Southern
College of Optometry to conclude that such an accommodation would
be a fundamental alteration in the sports program and would go
beyond a reasonable modification. 20 5
The court further supported its position of not granting a
waiver under these circumstances. It noted that McPherson did not
play sports earlier due to Ann Arbor school district's higher aca-
demic eligibility standards. 20 6 The Sixth Circuit also emphasized
that McPherson's learning disability was not diagnosed until after
his semester eligibility expired.20 7 The court was sympathetic to
MHSAA's concern that to allow a waiver here would create an unde-
sirable precedent in which a school district could control a player's
eligibility while the athletic association could not.2 0 8
202. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 462. Huron High School's athletic director,
Jane Bennett, had supplied information to the MHSAA about McPherson's physi-
cal characteristics. See id. at 457. Bennett described McPherson as "less than aver-
age height and lower than average weight compared to not only members of [the
Huron] team but a good sample of [Huron] opponents." Id. With regard to team-
mates and competitors, Bennett did not believe that McPherson posed a safety risk
or that he was the "best player on the team." Id.
203. See id. at 463.
204. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 462. The court noted that the MHSAA would
have an immense burden to make "near-impossible determinations" about the rel-
ative physical and athletic maturity of any student desiring a waiver. Id. The ma-
jority recognized that it would be extremely difficult for the MHSAA to
differentiate between legitimate requests for waivers and those seeking to gain an
unfair advantage. See id. at 463. The court was concerned that an increase in the
number of students seeking waivers would be extremely troublesome and finan-
cially burdensome for the MHSAA. See id. at 462. Further, the court reasoned that
if an increased number of students gained unfair advantages through waivers, then
these students could detrimentally affect interscholastic athletics. See id. at 463.
205. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461 (citing Doherty v. Southern College of
Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1988)) (noting that waiver of necessary
requirement was substantial rather than reasonable accommodation).
206. See id. at 463. The court emphasized that the Ann Arbor school district
had previously forbidden McPherson from playing in interscholastic sports for his
first six semesters in high school due to failure to meet a higher academic standard
than that required by the MHSAA. See id.
207. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 463. The school district had never referred
McPherson for examination of a possible learning disability until fall 1994, after
his semester eligibility expired. Compare id. (no previous testing) with Hoot v. Mi-
lan Area Schs., 853 F. Supp. 243, 245 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (multiple psychological
and special education tests throughout student's schooling).
208. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 463. The court concluded that such precedent
would encourage school districts and coaches to engage in redshirting. See id.
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The majority concluded that the plaintiff did not make a suc-
cessful claim under the ADA.20 9 Further, since a Rehabilitation Act
claim requires the same elements as an ADA claim with the addi-
tional requirement of federal financial assistance, the court held
that the plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim also failed.210 As a re-
sult, the court vacated the preliminary injunction and reversed the
decision. 211
2. Dissenting Opinions
Circuit Judge Merritt, writing. a dissenting opinion, focused on
his concern that the majority opinion did not deal with the issue of
whether the MHSAA could now punish the school district.212 Judge
Merritt would have the court oppose any retaliation by an athletic
association against school districts that were merely acting in com-
pliance with a district court injunction.21 3 Judge Merritt found un-
persuasive the contrary view espoused by the state supreme court in
Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic
Association.214
In a separate dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Moore argued
that the case was moot and that no case or controversy existed.215
The judge used the analysis in Jordan v. Indiana High School Athletic
Association to support the notion that no controversy exists when
While the court did not imply that the Ann Arbor school district's purpose was
redshirting in this case, it still determined that allowing a waiver would threaten
the regulation's purpose of deterring redshirting. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. Further, the court also noted that it did not fully determine
whether the MHSAA was a public or private entity operating a place of public
accommodation. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 463. This issue was left unaddressed by
the district court. See id. By not directly answering the question, the court left it
unclear whether the MHSAA is even covered under the Rehabilitation Act. See id.
211. See id. at 464.
212. See id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).
213. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 464 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (citing Crocker v.
Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 89-6450, 1990 WL 104036, at *4 (6th
Cir. July 25, 1990) (noting unfairness in penalizing schools that followed district
court rulings)).
214. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 464 (Merritt, J., dissenting); Cardinal Mooney
High Sch. v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 467 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Mich. 1991).
In Cardinal Mooney, the state supreme court upheld the validity of the retroactive
punishment rule based upon the agreement of MHSAA member schools to submit
to regulations as a condition of membership. Id. For a complete discussion of
Cardinal Mooney, see supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
215. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 464-65 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore
noted that when a case becomes moot on appeal, the court is without jurisdiction
to consider the merits of the appeal. See id. (Moore,J., dissenting) (citing Honig v.
Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988)).
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the school district is not part of the appeal.216 Judge Moore disre-
garded the reasoning in Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities
Association, which involved a clear intent of the athletic association
to impose sanctions on the district, by noting that the cases conflict
on the issue of whether the plaintiff still has a stake in the out-
come. 217 Finally, Judge Moore contended that since the school dis-
trict is not adverse to the MHSAA, the entire controversy should be
vacated as moot and that the injunction should be vacated by the
district court.218
B. Critical Analysis
Overall, the McPherson majority aligned itself with other cases
that refuse to allow eligibility rule waivers for student-athletes with
disabilities. 219 This view still has not emerged as the clear majority
rule since other courts have held the opposing position. 22° Of the
different decisions regarding the eligibility of student athletes with
disabilities, McPherson is the first to fully decide the relation of the
Rehabilitation Act and ADA to maximum semester rules. While the
court may have correctly interpreted the mootness issue, the rela-
tion of the Rehabilitation Act to the ADA and the necessity of se-
mester regulations, it should have been persuaded by the argument
that a semester regulation waiver was a reasonable modification.
216. See id. at 466 (Moore, J., dissenting); Jordan v. Indiana High Sch. Ath-
letic Ass'n,' 16 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1994) (declining to find existence of case or
controversy when school district was no longer party to suit).
217. SeeMcPherson, 119 F.3d at 466 (Moore,J., dissenting); Pottgen v. Missouri
State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 928 (finding controversy not moot
since athletic association intended to sanction school district). Judge Moore noted
that in Jordan, the Seventh Circuit found the controversy moot because the plain-
tiff had merely participated on the team and had not achieved individual records.
See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 466 (Moore,J., dissenting) (citing Jordan, 16 F.3d at 788).
218. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 467-68 (Moore, J., dissenting).
219. See Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026,
1035, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding age-eligibility rule was valid under Rehabilita-
tion Act and ADA); Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d
926, 930-31 (8th Cir. 1994) (permitting enforcement of maximum age rule against
learning disabled student). But see Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic
Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 671 (D. Conn.), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d
Cir. 1996) (enjoining athletic conference from prohibiting disabled student's par-
ticipation in athletics); Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 899 F.
Supp. 579, 586 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.3d 1172, 1173 (11th Cir.
1997) (entitling student to preliminary injunction after showing of likelihood of
success on merits).
220. See, e.g., Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 671 (enjoining athletic conference from
prohibiting disabled student's participation in athletics); Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at
586 (granting injunction against enforcement of maximum age rule).
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1. Mootness
By initially deciding that the case was not moot, the Sixth Cir-
cuit followed its earlier ruling in Sandison v. Michigan High School
Athletic Association, Inc. that both parties still retained a legal interest
in the proceedings. 22 1 Past circuit court rulings split on whether an
appeal was moot when the student played through a season and
graduated.22 2 The McPherson court, however, differentiated itself
from past circuit court rulings by noting that the plaintiff had spe-
cifically requested that the MHSAA refrain from taking action
against the school district.22 3 This would make the decision consis-
tent with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Jordan v. Indiana High
School Athletic Association since in that case, the plaintiff did not seek
to enjoin the athletic association from punishing the school. 22 4
Nevertheless, the McPherson decision still remains in conflict with
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Florida High School Activ-
ities Association, Inc., which ruled that despite having the plaintiff
seek to enjoin enforcement of penalties against his high school, the
case was still moot.2 2 5 The Sixth Circuit's position, however, is ap-
propriate when considering McPherson's specific request for relief
and the MHSAA's insistence on penalizing the school district.
2. Issuance of preliminary injunction
In examining the issuance of the injunction, the court's analy-
sis of the relation of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA was also consis-
tent with the current viewpoint regarding the two acts. 226 The acts
221. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458-59; Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1030 (finding that
plaintiffs retained interest in preventing athletic association from erasing records
and performances).
222. Compare Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 928 (concluding live controversy existed when
injunction prohibited imposition of sanctions on high school) with Johnson, 102
F.3d at 1173 (stating that no case and controversy existed when student had gradu-
ated and high school was not party to suit); Dennin, 94 F.3d at 100, 102 (dismissing
appeal as moot since student played and finished regular season); and Jordan v.
Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 16 F.3d 785, 787-89 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling
that no live controversy existed between student and athletic association after stu-
dent had graduated and high school was not party to suit).
223. McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458.
224. Jordan, 16 F.3d at 786-87; see also Dennin, 94 F.3d at 100 (recognizing that
no further relief was sought by plaintiffs other than waiver of age rule).
225. Johnson, 102 F.3d at 1173. In Johnson, the plaintiffs complaint specifically
requested an injunction forbidding the activities association from penalizing the
school for his participation in interscholastic athletics. Id. The Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the case as moot since the plaintiffs high school was not a party to the
case. See id.
226. See Weber, supra note 19, at 1097 (noting how Congress intended section
504 and title II of ADA to be more similar than different). Since section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act is the basis for the ADA, the general provisions, regulations and
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have virtually the same requirements with the exception that Reha-
bilitation Act claims require that the program receives federal
funding.227
a. ADA claim
In discussing the ADA claim, the court properly determined
that it had to decide whether or not McPherson could meet the
requirements of the program, with or without a reasonable accom-
modation. 228 If McPherson was "otherwise qualified" and the MH-
SAA could have, but did not, reasonably accommodate his
disability, then McPherson could demonstrate discrimination by
the MHSAA against him.2 29 This analysis directly follows the ADA's
definition of a "qualified individual. '" 230
The majority concluded that McPherson was not "qualified"
and that a reasonable accommodation was not possible. 231 The
court based this determination on its view that the semester rule
was a necessary regulation and on its conclusion that waiver of this
rule would be a fundamental alteration. 232 In determining that the
semester rule was a necessary requirement, the Sixth Circuit re-
mained consistent with its prior holding in Sandison v. Michigan
High School Athletic Association, Inc. 23 3 and the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion in Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Association 34 that
the age requirement was a necessary requirement. Considering the
regulation's stated purposes, the court's determination that the se-
mester rule is a necessary requirement was reasonable. 235
judicial interpretations of the ADA parallel those of section 504. See id. at 1120. See
also Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996)
(stating that analysis of ADA claims roughly coincides with Rehabilitation Act
claims).
227. For a discussion of the relation between the two acts, see supra notes 51-
58 and accompanying text. See also Weber, supra note 19 (comparing ADA to Re-
habilitation Act).
228. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 460-64. In analyzing an ADA claim, the court
must assess the ability of the individual to work with accommodations. See Wilkin-
son, supra note 49, at 929. In an employment situation, the court must consider
the individual and the job to determine if a reasonable modification would allow
the individual to perform the essential functions of the position. See id. at 912.
229. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 460-61.
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994) (defining "qualified individual" as indi-
vidual with disability who can meet essential eligibility requirements for program
with or without reasonable modifications).
231. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 462.
232. See id. at 461-62.
233. 64 F.3d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir. 1995).
234. 40 F.3d 926, 929-31 (8th Cir. 1994).
235. For a discussion of the purposes of the maximum semester regulation,
see supra note 159.
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The court, however, recognized that the semester rule permit-
ted waivers while the age rule did not.23 6 This difference might be
enough of a distinction to consider a waiver of the semester rule to
be a reasonable accommodation rather than a fundamental altera-
tion since the MHSAA already permitted waivers for this rule. The
McPherson court, however, declined to find a waiver of the semester
regulation to be a reasonable modification.23 7 The Sixth Circuit's
position appears to disregard the spirit of the laws when it strictly
applies the test that a modification is not reasonable if it would
"fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activ-
ity." 23 8 Since the semester rule already allows exceptions, allowing a
waiver would not necessitate a fundamental change for the MH-
SAA's eligibility requirements and should be considered a reason-
able accommodation. The mere existence of a mechanism for
semester rule waivers also seems to imply that the rule is not a nec-
essary requirement.
b. Rehabilitation Act claim
By rejecting the ADA claim, the court was consistent in dispos-
ing of the Rehabilitation Act claim. In addition to all of the ADA
requirements, claims under the Rehabilitation Act require that the
program receives federal funding.239 Therefore, failure to meet the
more limited standards of the ADA automatically results in a failure
to meet the higher standards of the Rehabilitation Act. The Mc-
Pherson court, however, did not fully determine whether the MH-
SAA was a public entity that the Rehabilitation Act covers. 240
Athletic associations do not necessarily qualify as a "public entity"
under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.241 Since the court failed
236. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461.
237. Id. at 462.
238. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7) (1997). See also Julia V. Kasperski, Comment,
Disabled High School Athletes and the Right to Participate: Are Age Waivers Reasonable
Modifications Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 49
BAYLOR L. REv. 175, 196 (1997) (characterizing courts that do not view waivers
reasonable as ignoring "spirit of the anti-discrimination statutes").
239. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
240. McPherson, 119 F.3d at 463. The district court did not address this issue.
See id. The lower court only noted that the athletic association was subject to the
ADA either under Title II as a public entity or under Title III as a private entity
operating a place of public accommodation. See id.
241. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (covering programs or activities "receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service"); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)
(1994) (defining "public entity" to refer to any "agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government"). See also Hoot v.
Milan Area Schs., 853 F. Supp. 243, 251 (1994) (failing to conclude with degree of
certainty whether MHSAA is public entity).
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to make that determination, a successful McPherson ADA claim
may or may not fulfill the elements for a claim under the Rehabili-
tation Act.
c. Suggested approach
Instead of the McPherson approach, courts should apply the Re-
habilitation Act and the ADA to certain cases involving athletic asso-
ciation maximum semester rules. One of the main purposes for
high school regulations prohibiting redshirting is to prevent com-
petition between individuals differing in strength, ability and expe-
rience.242 If the student has a legitimate disability and no redshirt
abuse seems evident, courts should issue and uphold injunctions
based on Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims as a reasonable modifi-
cation of the program. 24 3 Such modifications would be especially
reasonable in states where athletic associations permit waivers of
some or all of their eligibility requirements24 4 because the athletic
associations already allow deviations from the set requirements in
these jurisdictions. This approach is preferable since the Rehabili-
tation Act and ADA were specifically enacted to help accommodate
persons with legitimate disabilities in as many aspects of society as
possible. 24 5
V. IMPACT
With the McPherson decision, the Sixth Circuit has effectively
disallowed the use of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA by athletes
with disabilities to waive eligibility requirements. The Sixth Circuit
is the first circuit court to address the applicability of the two anti-
discrimination statutes to maximum semester rules. As a result, the
McPherson decision will set the precedent regarding the application
of the disability statutes to maximum semester regulations for cir-
cuit courts across the country.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded that semester rules are a nec-
essary requirement. 24 6 It also ruled that waiver of these rules, which
are allowable, would constitute a fundamental alteration in the pro-
gram.2 47 This interpretation of semester rules indicates that the
While the MHSAA is a private association, it was established by state law. See
Hoot, 853 F. Supp. at 250 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1289(2)).
242. See WONG, supra note 4, at 277-78 (noting justification for redshirting).
243. See WONG, supra note 4, at 322 (stating that age rules may be unreasona-
ble when applied to older disabled students).
244. See, e.g., MHSAA CONST., art. VII, § 4(E) (allowing waiver of all eligibility
regulations except for maximum age).
245. See supra notes 19 & 49-50 and accompanying text.
246. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461.
247. See id.
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court will consider other regulations, besides those that are non-
waivable, as necessary requirements. By characterizing the waiver
to be a fundamental alteration, the Sixth Circuit also casts doubt
onto what constitutes a reasonable modification. Potential plain-
tiffs are now limited to claims that involve a requirement that the
court does not consider necessary and a modification that the court
deems reasonable.
The court also supported the efforts to enforce eligibility regu-
lations to discourage redshirting and other anti-academic practices.
Part of the court's concern in denying a waiver was that McPherson
was not diagnosed as learning disabled until after his semester eligi-
bility had run its course. 248 While abuse was probably not present
in this case, the majority did not want to encourage overzealous
coaches and athletic programs elsewhere to try and obtain a waiver
through claiming a disability. High school athletic programs are
now considerably limited from trying to use students, who may or
may not have a legitimate disability, that have surpassed eligibility
requirements. Despite this severe limitation, the majority appears
to leave some room open for athletic programs to use students with
legitimate disabilities that have been diagnosed for a while.
With regard to students with disabilities, the McPherson deci-
sion strikes a further blow to their hopes of participating fully in
athletics. Coupled with its decision in Sandison v. Michigan High
School Athletic Association, Inc.,249 the Sixth Circuit has instituted a
policy of disallowing the application of disability legislation to ob-
tain a waiver of an athletic regulation. While the court effectively
followed precedent and used mostly sound reasoning in its judg-
ment, the McPherson decision still unfairly penalizes student-athletes
with disabilities who seek to use all of their athletic eligibility. The
decision runs counter to the policy of enabling the disabled to take
part completely in daily life.25 0 Until courts adopt this policy, deci-
sions like McPherson will further contribute to the widespread
discrimination and lesser treatment received by people with dis-
abilities.
John P. Encarnacion
248. See id. at 463.
249. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1034
(6th Cir. 1995) (holding waivers of necessary requirements to be unreasonable
modifications).
250. See Weber, supra note 19, at 1089-90 (noting that section 504 of Rehabili-
tation Act is key to "enabling persons with disabilities to participate in the fullness
of daily life in this country").
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